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The Standoff over Constitutional Reform in Belarus Leaves the EU and 
Russia on Opposite Sides of the Barricades
By Fabian Burkhardt (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000446834
A Geopolitical Crisis
Constitutions are thought to be of little interest in non-
democracies. Unconstrained authoritarian rulers bend 
and amend them at will, and they are regularly vio-
lated. Belarus appears to be a case in point: in 1996, 
Aliaksandr Lukashenka staged a power grab which 
many see as a coup d’ état, and in 2004, he had presi-
dential term limits removed altogether. Forty per cent 
of constitutional articles are either dormant or trumped 
by more restrictive presidential decrees or administra-
tive regulations according to Anatol Liabedzka, Sviat-
lana Tsikhanouskaya’s ombudsman for constitutional 
reform (currently under administrative detention him-
self). Nonetheless, the current standoff shows that con-
stitutions are crucial focal points for the management 
of regime succession and conflicts. They help coordi-
nate the elite and send signals to the population and the 
international community alike, even when the autocrat 
is not constrained.
Belarus’s long-term ruler Lukashenka and the opposi-
tion leader Tsikhanouskaya (in line with the Coordina-
tion Council) pursue irreconcilable goals. Lukashenka 
aims to divert attention away from the recent fraudulent 
election and wants to wear down and split the opposi-
tion by means of a lengthy constitutional amendment 
process. Its only goal: to bolster his grip on power. By 
contrast, the opposition seeks free and fair elections first 
before an open debate on the constitution could even-
tually be launched.
The EU and Russia officially state that a solution to 
the conflict should be achieved by Belarusians them-
selves. But the EU supports Tsikhanouskaya’s call for 
new elections and does not recognize Lukashenka as 
a legitimate president, while Russia endorsed Lukash-
enka’s constitutional reform as a means to overcome the 
current crisis. What started as a purely internal stand-
off over the fraudulent election and state repression is 
now a de facto geopolitical conflict.
Lukashenka’s Approach: Constitutional 
Amendments as Diversionary Tactics
Lukashenka’s aim is straightforward: the constitution 
needs to be changed in order to prevent fundamen-
tal change in principle. As early as 2012 Lukashenka 
announced it was necessary to “reform the political sys-
tem of Belarus.” Since then, he has built up expectations 
that change was imminent without making any cred-
ible commitments regarding the what, when and how 
of the amendments to the institutional framework. In 
2014, Lukashenka announced that Belarus had estab-
lished itself as a sovereign state, that the post-commu-
nist “transition period was over”. Sooner or later, he said, 
a new Constitution needs to be adopted.
In 2016, Lukashenka called for a group of “wise men 
and lawyers” to analyze the Basic Law. Moreover, the 
Belarusian ruler carefully monitored non-democratic 
power succession management in the post-Soviet space 
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. When in 2018 Serzh 
Sargsyan failed to retain power in the course of Arme-
nia’s Velvet Revolution after moving from the presiden-
tial into the prime minister’s seat, Lukashenka’s appe-
tite for constitutional change suddenly waned (https://
presidential-power.net/?p=8485). But in Spring 2019, 
Lukashenka announced he had tasked the Constitu-
tional Court to work on suggestions for reform which 
were then supposed to be implemented at some point 
after the 2020 presidential elections. At meetings with 
members of the opposition Public Constitutional Com-
mission and the Court’s chairman Petr Miklashevich 
in 2019 and 2020, Miklashevich declined to comment 
on details of the reform. He was forbidden to do so, he 
said, by deputy head of the Presidential Administration 
Olga Chupris, who oversaw the process.
On 28 August at a special meeting of the Permanent 
Council of the OSCE in Vienna, Belarus presented its 
plan to exit the crisis by means of constitutional reform. 
This proposal should be seen in the context of Lukash-
enka’s track record. Lukashenka has been consistently 
secretive and nontransparent—his secret inauguration 
on 23 September being the best illustration thereof—
and the process is tightly controlled by the Presidential 
Administration and exclusive: even regime insiders and 
loyalists have little knowledge or active participation in 
it. Lukashenka stated that work is underway on the third 
version of the reform package, but nothing is known 
about the content of the first two versions. In public, 
some redistribution of presidential powers to the govern-
ment and parliament as well as a more active role of polit-
ical parties—which might also imply including a pro-
portional element into the electoral code—are usually 
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mentioned as the main content of the reform. The proc-
ess pursued by Lukashenka includes the following steps: 
deputies of the House of Representatives are called upon 
to collect citizen input by 25 October; after a Nation-
wide Discussion on the amendments, an All-Belarusian 
People’s Assembly will be held; and lastly, after a referen-
dum on constitutional changes, new elections are to be 
held around 2022 or later.
Lukashenka has close to zero credibility when it 
comes to the content (reducing presidential powers) 
and process (making it more inclusive) of the reform. 
His visit to the KGB detention facility on 10 October 
to meet political prisoners was never meant to be the 
beginning of a dialogue. The goal was to co-opt Vik-
tar Babaryka and his representatives in the Coordina-
tion Council and therefore split the opposition through 
‘divide and rule’. Since 20 August, a criminal case has 
been opened against the Coordination Council for harm-
ing national security (Art. 361 of the Criminal Code); 
on 16 October, Belarusian authorities confirmed there 
is an international arrest warrant out for Sviatlana Tsik-
hanouskaya, a move supported by Russia.
Russia Sees Lukashenka’s Constitutional 
Reform as a Mechanism to Stabilize the 
Situation
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov supported Lukashenka’s pursuit of con-
stitutional reform on multiple occasions. On 02 Sep-
tember, Lavrov stated: “In this respect, we assess […] 
the initiative of President A.G. Lukashenka to conduct 
a constitutional reform as very promising. We think 
[…] that such a political process could become a use-
ful platform for a national dialogue, could contribute 
to overcoming the current situation, and could guaran-
tee the normalization of the situation, the stabilization 
of society.” (https://www.mid.ru/ru/vizity-ministra/-/
asset_publisher/IcoYBGcCUgTR/content/id/4308072). 
When hosting his Belarusian counterpart on 14 Sep-
tember in Sochi, Putin called Lukashenka’s constitu-
tional reform proposal “logical, timely, reasonable.” 
Lastly, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov lauded 
Lukashenka’s visit to the KGB prison as an “inclusive 
dialogue.”
This rhetoric appears to suggest that Russia unequiv-
ocally supports Lukashenka’s plans. In reality, Russia’s 
stance on Belarus is more complicated, as the Kremlin 
faces a dilemma. Lukashenka’s firm grip on power over 
decades also meant that Lukashenka was the ‘only game 
in town’ for Russia to negotiate bilateral relations with. 
Lukashenka nipped any alternative channels of com-
munication in the bud. The short stint of the hardliner 
Mikhail Babich as Russian ambassador in Minsk from 
August 2018 to April 2019 demonstrated how protec-
tive Lukashenka was of his monopoly on power. On 
the other hand, ‘Lukashenka fatigue’ is certainly wide-
spread in Moscow: it is well understood that Lukashenka 
is a geopolitical adventurer whose own interests do not 
always align with those of Russia, and that his domes-
tic standing is on more shaky ground than ever before.
A tedious constitutional reform process over months 
or even years equals a protracted ‘civil war of attrition’ 
that will be costly both for Lukashenka and the opposi-
tion. Moscow is likely to do just as much to keep Lukash-
enka on top of the process. Moreover, it will try to keep 
its support as cost-efficient as possible and will seek to 
make use of Lukashenka’s weakness to chip away at Bela-
rusian sovereignty in further negotiations of the bilateral 
road maps. In the meantime, a protracted constitutional 
reform process gives Moscow the opportunity to reach 
out to potential alternatives to Lukashenka to whom it 
could jump ship if/when the time is ripe. A redistribu-
tion of presidential powers to the government, parlia-
ment and political parties would mean that alternative 
centers of power—and therefore interlocutors—could 
emerge. Moscow, however, has a preference for a strong 
presidency as it needs only one single reliable interlocu-
tor to do business with. Therefore, even if a ‘negotiated 
power transition’ scenario emerged, Moscow’s interests 
would not align with those of the opposition since the 
negotiated transition would most likely be ‘intra-elite’.
The Belarusian Opposition Is United: Free 
and Fair Elections before Constitutional 
Reform
Proposals for constitutional reform are a traditional ele-
ment of opposition politics in Belarus, one such exam-
ple being the 2013–2015 People’s Referendum campaign. 
Even though the Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, and Tsep-
kala campaigns and later the united opposition candi-
date Tsikhanouskaya are what one might call the ‘new’ 
opposition, they share many commonalities with the 
‘old’ opposition parties and movements.
First, they share the rejection of the 1996 constitution 
and call for a reform process based on the 1994 constitu-
tion, with presidential term limits and proper separation 
of powers as core demands (https://democracy-reporting.
org/lukashenkos-offer-what-to-think-of-constitutional-
reform-in-belarus/). For example, Viktar Babaryka and 
his lawyer Maksim Znak proposed a constitutional ref-
erendum in June, one day after Babaryka was arrested. 
Second, beside content, there is also personal continuity 
with the ‘old’ opposition. Tsikhanouskaya’s represent-
atives for constitutional reform are Anatol Liabadzko, 
the former long-term chairman of the United Civic 
Party, and Mechislau Hryb, the chairman of the Bela-
rusian Supreme Council from 1994 to 1996 affiliated 
with the Belarusian Social-Democratic Party (People’s 
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Assembly). Together with former Constitutional Court 
judge Mikhail Pastukhou, they have been active in the 
Public Constitutional Commission since 2019. One project 
of the Coordination Council and the election monitor-
ing platform Golos is to collect verified electronic votes 
for the strategy “free and fair elections first, constitu-
tional reform later” (https://golos2020.org/constitution). 
The campaign Svezhy Vetser, promoted by Coordination 
Council core member Andrey Yahorau, also petitions to 
boycott any constitutional change as it perceives Bela-
rusian sovereignty as endangered (https://канстытуцыя.
бел/). Russia might not only be interested in keeping 
Lukashenka in power or in negotiating a power trans-
fer, but also in fundamentally undermining Belarusian 
sovereignty by sneaking in a provision on the prior-
ity of the Union State over the Belarusian constitution. 
Indeed, according to Art. 61 of the Union State Treaty, 
in the course of deeper integration, the basic laws of both 
member countries would need to be amended.
What sets the ‘new’ opposition apart from the ‘old’ 
is that it has managed to stay surprisingly united despite 
unprecedented pressure by the authorities. Ideational 
and personal continuity with the ‘old’ opposition, as well 
as their united position of non-recognition of the August 
presidential election and of Lukashenka’s constitutional 
reform plans, explain why Lukashenka forced presidium 
members of the Coordination Council abroad or arrested 
them. It also explains why the opposition’s People’s Ulti-
matum, which demands Lukashenka step down before 
a national strike is announced, set 25 October as the 
date for the fulfillment of its demands: this is the dead-
line Lukashenka set for citizen suggestions to his con-
stitutional reform plan.
The stakes are high, and the EU and Russia find 
themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. Calls 
upon the OSCE to become a neutral mediator in the 
conflict between Lukashenka and the opposition are 
naive at best. Russia (in the person of prime minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin) already once mediated in a con-
stitutional crisis in 1996. The result: it was only Rus-
sia that recognized the 1996 constitutional referendum, 
while the EU and US rejected it as a coup d’ état. The 
effect the 1998–2002 Advisory and Monitoring Group 
of the OSCE (https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/
yearbook/english/99/Wieck.pdf) had on Lukashenka 
and the future trajectory of the regime is visible to this 
day. Whether history will repeat itself this time will 
largely depend on the courageous Belarusian people 
themselves.
About the Author
Dr Fabian Burkhardt is a research fellow at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regens-
burg. His research focuses on executive politics and elites in authoritarian regimes, with a regional focus on Rus-
sia and Belarus. He contributed a country study on Belarus for an edited volume on constitutional politics in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe  (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-658-13762-5_19) and published on 
concepts of the Belarusian nation among regime, opposition, and civil society actors (https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1057/9781137489449_7).
At a Loss: The Kremlin Has No Winning Belarus Strategy
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Well in advance of the Belarusian presidential elec-tions, it was quite clear that Moscow would make 
an unequivocal choice in favor of the incumbent, Alex-
ander Lukashenko. This forecast could be safely made 
from two arguments.
First, the Kremlin cannot be expected to agree to 
resolve the question of who should be in power in Bela-
rus through free and fair elections, let alone through 
popular protest. That could create a precedent for Russia 
itself, and therefore, ought to be ruled out from the out-
set. Second, despite his ability to occasionally frustrate 
Russia, Lukashenko is generally a partner with whom 
Moscow can confidently engage. So long as he stays in 
control in Belarus, the country will not build a trust-
based relationship with the West and will not start the 
economic and political reforms necessary to make Bela-
rus more resilient and less structurally dependent on 
Russia for economic assistance.
For these reasons it should not have come as a sur-
prise that Moscow placed its diplomatic, economic and 
information resources behind the self-declared “winner” 
and even promised to provide police reinforcements if 
